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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
S & F SUPPLY COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation; BURGER-IN-THE 
ROUND, a Delaware corporation; 
ANDREW W. SOUVALL, ROULA P. 
SOUVALL, his wife; PETER W. j 
SOUVALL, MARY SOUVALL, his | 
wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
&nd 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, j 
Intervening Plaintiff, 
vs. 
S. CRAIG HUNTER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
AND INTERVENING PLAINTIFF 
Due to the lapse of some 18 months since the record 
on appeal was filed, the plaintiffs and intervening plain-
tiff applied for permission to file this additional Brief. 
However, it is difficult in a fraud case to be "brief" be-
cause the facts are complex and require a detailed ex-
planation to enable this court to agree that the trial 
judge and jury committed no error. Plaintiffs will con-
tinue to designate the Transcript by the numbers placed 
at the bottom of the record by the Clerk of the Court, 
rather than the reporter's page number at the top, as 
appellant has done. 
Case No. 
12686 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As set forth in the original Brief of Intervening 
Plaintiff-Respondent filed by the United States Attor-
ney's office, this matter originated when the plaintiff 
corporations filed bankruptcy in early February of 1970 
(Tr. 254) on a $200,000 Small Business Administration 
(herein called "SBA") loan, being serviced and par-
ticipated in 25% by Zions First National Bank (herein 
called "Bank"). The SB A and the Bank granted per-
mission to the individual guarantors, Peter and Andy 
Souvall, to sell and liquidate the pledged assets in order 
to repay the loan, all of which was subject to obtaining 
disclaimers from the Bankruptcy Court. Souvalls sold 
a restaurant in Provo and another on 4th South in Salt 
Lake City, which reduced the loan balance to about 
$150,000 when Craig Hunter ("Hunter") approached the 
Souvalls on February 15 and said he was interested in 
purchasing the 10,000 shares of Universal Leasing stock 
which had been pledged by the Souvalls to the Bank to-
gether with mortgages on their homes as personal col-
lateral for the corporate loan. There is no dispute in any 
of the testimony that Hunter, the buyer, came to the 
Souvalls to purchase the stock, because on February 12 
he had been invited to a meeting at the Towne House in 
Salt Lake City by Jerry Timothy and McKay Smith 
where he met Mark Eames and his attorney who told 
him: (1) that Universal Leasing had been merged into 
Universal Rockwell the previous December; (2) that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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10,000 shares of Universal Leasing stock belonging to 
Souvalls now represented 4,530,000 shares of Universal 
Rockwell with Mark Eames as president; (3) that 
Timothy was going to merge his company, North Star 
Marine Sales, with assets of approximately $1,500,000 
into Universal Rockwell; (4) that they needed Hunter 
in the deal because he had a NSAD broker's license, and 
they needed somebody to make a market in the stock and 
tell brokers about it (Tr. 605, 606). Eames told Hunter 
that Souvalls were in financial trouble and that their 
stock would be available for sale (Tr. 607). Eames gave 
Hunter two financial statements, one dated 3/31/69 and 
one dated 11/30/69 (Tr. 606), and also the subject was 
discussed that the Souvall stock could be made free trad-
ing stock (Tr. 676), because of a change in circumstances, 
and that it could be pegged on the market at 10c a share 
(Tr. 710, 755). There was evidence that the jury could 
believe that Hunter anticipated selling the 4,530,000 
shares for $450,000. 
Hunter then went to Souvalls, and they told him to 
get any information he wanted, outside of the fact that 
they were willing to sell it, from the Bank (Tr. 608). 
Throughout the entire trial and in the appellant's original 
brief, he did not claim that the Souvalls misled him by 
any omissions to state information which they concealed 
or withheld. 
At this point, it might be well to interject the Plead-
ings (counterclaim for fraud) filed by Hunter, which 
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alleged that the Souvalls, as sellers of the stock, omitted 
to tell Hunter "(a) that Universal Rockwell, Ltd. was in 
very serious financial difficulty and (b) that because 
of such difficulty the stock of said corporation would 
become valueless within a short period of time," con-
stituting a scheme to defraud under 61-1-22(b), U.C.A. 
1953 (Tr. 23). The Bank intervened in the case, alleging 
that after Hunter signed the agreement of purchase dated 
March 9, 1970, he requested the Bank to release the stock 
to him on the basis of his promises that he owned New 
York stocks and that he would liquidate those stocks to 
pay cash, as the agreement required, and further, that 
he had executed a promissory note to evidence his pur-
chase plus interest thereon (Tr. 25). To the intervener's 
Complaint, Hunter counterclaimed that the Bank knew 
that the stock was worthless and knew that the finanncial 
statements which the Bank gave him were inaccurate, 
misleading and false. Thereafter, the Counterclaim 
alleged a cause of action against the Bank for common 
law fraud in knowingly, with intent to deceive, delivering 
false financial statements of Universal Leasing, with 
intent that Hunter be deceived thereby, to his damage 
(Tr. 36). However, the Counterclaim never pleaded that 
the Bank was the seller of the stock by any theory of 
agency, nor was the Bank charged with statutory fraud 
under the Securities Act (61-1-22(2); omissions to state 
material facts). 
The big difference in testimony is that Hunter testi-
fied that he left the Souvalls and went to the Bank, and 
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he asked Don Bennett, Commercial Loan Officer, what 
information he had on Universal Leasing; that Bennett 
gave him a financial statement dated 8/31/69, Ex. 18P 
(Tr. 609); that Hunter told Bennett he had two financial 
statements already and wanted to compare it to them. 
On the face of the statements it appeared that the com-
pany was in good shape, and thereafter Hunter and his 
attorney, Reed Watkins, proceeded to negotiate the 
agreement to purchase the stock and other assets for 
$133,500 (Ex. 3P). Before calling upon Hunter as a 
witness, counsel for appellant called Don Bennett to the 
witness stand. Bennett testified that prior to January 
of 1970, Universal Leasing had borrowed funds from 
the Bank of Spanish Fork prior to that bank's being 
merged into Zions Firs t National Bank (Tr. 354); that 
in December of 1969 or January of 1970 he received some 
financial statements of Universal Leasing Corporation 
from the Spanish Fork office of the Bank. These state-
ments had never been in possession of the Souvalls, and 
they did not know anything about them or their contents. 
(Tr. 355). When Mr. Hunter first approached the Bank 
he wanted to purchase the loan directly from the Bank; 
to buy the loan and the assets and assume the whole obli-
gation (Tr. 370); that he did not recall giving Hunter a 
copy of a financial statement (Tr. 366); that he had two 
financial statements in his possession with the same 
date (Tr. 368). Bennett said that he went to the files and 
showed Hunter the latest statements which were both 
dated 8/31/69 (Ex. 13P and 14P) (Tr. 373) and explained 
that he was not sure which one was right, if either one 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
of them were correct, and also that the statements showed 
that Universal Leasing Corporation owned 100% of Uni-
versal Eockwell, which was converse to what his under-
standing had been (Tr. 374). The two statements showed 
a difference in net worth of approximately $12,000 and 
difference in total assets of $800,000 (Tr. 374), and Ben-
nett told Hunter that he was soot sure which one was cor-
rect. 
On February 27, 1970, Bennett called Mark Eames 
on the telephone, who told him that the free trading stock 
in Universal Rockwell was trading for $05c a share, and 
that the August 31, 1969, statement which was received 
from Spanish Fork was apparently incorrectly prepared 
and that Eames would send a copy of the 11/30/69 
financial statement (Ex. 16P). Bennett testified that at 
the time plaintiffs were applying for the SBA loan, Sou-
valls brought in a letter of John C. Swenson dated May 
15, 1969, which stated that Swenson offered to purchase 
at any time it was offered for sale the Souvall 10,000 
shares of stock in Universal Leasing Corporation at Ten 
Dollars per share (Ex. 15P). Other than the Swenson 
letter and his conversation with Mr. Eames on 2/27/70, 
Bennett had no further information concerning the value 
of the Universal Eockwell shares (Tr. 380). 
Hunter and his attorney then commenced to negotiate 
an agreement for the sale of the stock. He did not ask 
for any further information from the Souvalls, or even 
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have any discussion as to its inherent value (Tr. 654). 
Souvall's attorney explained that there were two major 
legal problems involved. First, that the sale agreement 
had to be approved by the Bankruptcy Court (Tr. 658), 
and second, that this was investment stock. Hunter in-
sisted that before he would make any deal that it be 
made free trading stock (Tr. 659). This was accomplished 
by Hunter hiring attorney Alex Walker who took ex-
tensive affidavits from the Souvalls and the Bank of-
ficers, and then advised Mr. Craig Hunter by letter of 
all the facts leading up to the SBA loan and that the 
business calamity which occurred could not have been rea-
sonably foreseen by the Souvalls or the Bank at the time 
the loan was made. His letter (Ex. 32P) concluded by 
saying that all of the parties had acted in good faith; 
the pledge of the stock was bona fide. The Bank did not 
make a cursory examination, nor was it dealing with the 
Souvalls for the first time, but was dealing with long-
established customers; that Walker knew that the SBA 
makes a very thorough investigation of every applicant 
for a loan prior to the time it is approved. "Thus the 
conclusion is inescapable that the Souvalls sustained a 
change of circumstances with regard to their investment 
intent, as that term is known under the Federal Securities 
Acts, subsequent to obtaining the loan in question. Thus 
the sale by the Souvalls to S. Craig Hunter would not 
require registration with theUnited States Securities and 
Exchange Commission." Hunter had talked to Mark 
Eames prior to the Walker meeting, and he felt that the 
Board of Universal Rockwell would free up the stock. 
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He also got assurance from Alex Walker, who had dis-
cussed the matter with Mr. Cahoon, attorney for Uni-
versal Eockwell (Tr. 676). 
The merger agreement between North Star Marine 
Sales and Universal Rockwell was signed February 16, 
1970 (Ex. 27P) and., roughly, this merged fixed assets 
owned by North Star Marine of One and One-half Million 
Dollars into Universal Eockwell which had a net worth 
of $562,000 (Tr. 643) according to its 11/30/69 statement 
(Ex. 23D). The North Star Marine assets consisted of 
a sailing ship named the "Stella Polaris" valued at $325,-
000, an airplane valued at $55,000 and stocks and bonds 
representing 40,000 acres of land in the middle of Brazil 
valued at $1,250,000. See Exhibits 28P and 37P. Through-
out his negotiations, Hunter did not tell the Souvalls, 
Don Bennett nor John Langeland about the merger be-
tween North Star Marine Sales and Universal Eockwell. 
Mr. John Langeland testified at the request of coun-
sel for Hunter and stated that he was Senior Vice Presi-
dent at the Bank and had been a director in Dinner Table 
(Tr. 433). He had been a one percent owner of stock in 
the Dinner Table. The first time he met Hunter in con-
nection with this transaction, Hunter wanted to buy all 
of the assets under the loan (Tr. 452). He signed the 
agreement that the Bank approved the transaction, but 
the Bank was not a party to it (Tr. 454). Mr. Hunter 
never asked John Langeland about his knowledge of the 
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financial condition of Universal Leasing nor anything 
about its prospects in business (Tr. 465). Hunter led 
Langeland to believe that he had New York securities 
which would be adequate to make the purchase of the 
Souvall stock (Tr. 465). Langeland assured attorney 
Alvin Smith that Hunter would be able to perform be-
cause of the assurances Hunter had given that he had 
New York stocks (Tr. 471). 
As a result of all of his information and discussions, 
Hunter, on February 28, 1970, first agreed to pay $150,-
000 for the equity in the homes of the Souvalls, the High-
land Drive location, inventory at 110 West 33rd South, 
a 'California conditional sales agreement, and the stock 
(Ex. 20D). This agreement was superseded by the final 
agreement, signed March 9, 1970, for $133,500, which did 
not include the homes. He testified that the only thing 
he wanted was the stock (Tr. 748) and that he did not 
care whether it was a $150,000 agreement with the homes 
going back to Souvalls or whether it was $133,500 with-
out the houses going back (Tr. 748). At the time he 
signed his agreement for $133,500, he had an agreement 
to sell the Highland Drive location to Ernest Psarras, 
who had already made arrangements with the Souvalls 
to buy this location for $35,000 (Tr. 611). This money 
was paid by Psarras . Also, an additional $18,252,69 was 
paid by Hunter by a $9,000 cashiers check and the sale 
of inventory items, which total payments of $53,252.69 
were credited to the agreement at the Bank (Ex. 10P). 
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On May 27, 1970, the merger between Universal 
Rockwell Corporation and North Star Marine Sales, Inc. 
was rescinded by written agreement (Ex. 29P). Mark 
Eames, President of Rockwell, testified that there was 
discord between the parties involved (Tr. 573), to-wit. 
Eames and Timothy. "What was misrepresented to us 
by Mr. Timothy was the fact that there was no cash flow 
requirements on our part to service this debt; that this 
company of its own could service its own debt cash flow 
requirements. We found that after the merger this was 
not true." The matter of rescission had been discussed 
as early as May 13. Nevertheless, Mr. Hunter was the 
power behind Mr. Timothy (Tr. 696) hiring accountant 
Robert Apgood, who prepared a financial statement 
dated May 27, 1970, which showed total assets of over 
Four Million Dollars, including all the assets of North 
Star Marine Sales. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT THE BANK WAS THE AGENT 
OF THE SELLERS FOR THE GIVING OF INFOR-
MATION. 
There was a great preponderance of evidence that 
Hunter was an eager, anxious buyer of the stock because 
10c a share times 4,530,000 shares equals $453,000. This 
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was the prospect that was tendered to him in the Towne 
House by Timothy and Eames on February 12, 1970. He 
was going to get free trading stock upon which no S.E.C. 
registration had been made, nor prospectus issued, and 
this talk of a merger was not known by the sellers or the 
Bank, but only by him. 
The major problem which arose for the plaintiff 
and intervening plaintiff was how to present to the court, 
instructions to the jury in such a case as this. There 
were two separate counterclaims by Hunter; one against 
the Souvalls for statutory fraud under 61-1-22(b) and 
one for common law fraud against the Bank. The Bank 
also claimed that Hunter had defrauded it by obtaining 
the shares of stock on March 25 on the basis of his false 
statements that he had New York securities and was 
about to liquidate them to pay for the Universal Leasing 
shares. Because of the Bank's complaint for fraud and 
the two separate counterclaims for fraud, the Court 
agreed with the plaintiffs to submit the case to the jury 
on 25 written interrogatories under Rule 49(a). This 
enabled the defendant to squarely argue that if they 
found that Don Bennett gave Craig Hunter a false or 
misleading financial statement, they cauld so indicate in 
answer to Interrogatory Nos. 11,12,13 and 14 (Tr. 186). 
By the same short questions the jury found that Craig 
Hunter, in order to induce the plaintiffs to sell the stock 
and the Bank to approve the sale, made false represen-
tations (that he had New York stocks), but that it was 
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not made with fraudulent intent as to the Souvalls (In-
terrogatory No. 7; Tr. 185), but it was to the Bank (In-
terrogatory No. 8; Tr. 186); that the Bank did not act 
with ordinary prudence in relying on the representation 
(Interrogatory No. 9; Tr. 186). Thereafter, the jury 
found that the plaintiffs did not sell the stock to the de-
fendant by means of any untrue statement of a material 
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary 
in order to make the statements made in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made not mislead-
ing (Interrogatories Nos. 19 and 20; Tr. 187). This is 
the language of the statute 61-1-22 (b). The jury was 
very knowledgable and able to intelligently answer the 
questions put to them. Their answers were a far better 
finding of the true facts in the case than any general 
verdict. 
The appellant argues that the Court should have 
instructed the jury under its Bequest at Tr. 147, "that 
Zions Bank was the agent of the plaintiffs for the giving 
of information about Universal Leasing to the defen-
dant." This request was made as a matter of law, not 
an issue of fact. Such a requested instruction is inapplic-
able to this case because the testimony was that Souvalls 
did not know that the Bank had the financial statements 
from its Spanish Fork branch office which Bennett dis-
cussed with, and pointed out the differences to Craig 
Hunter. So the principal should not be liable, if the agent 
goes beyond the implied authority to show authorized 
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information which is in the principal's file (Souvall) 
and shows something else which the principal is wholly 
unaware of. The next point is that the defendant wanted 
this submitted on a general verdict where he could argue 
everything all together that both the Bank and the plain-
tiffs were guilty of fraud, if they made a false represen-
tation, or if they omitted^ to give material facts. The 
Bank was not the seller of the stock, which Hunter well 
knew, and if he wanted to bottom his case on something 
that the Bank knew and withheld, then the Counterclaim 
should have alleged this statutory duty of the Bank to 
have complied with 61-1-22 (2). 
This is particularly true in this case because the 
statute (61-1-22) states at subsection (2): 
Every person who directly or indirectly con-
trols a seller, every person occupying a similar 
status or performing similar functions, every em-
ployee of such a seller who materially aids in the 
sale, and every broker-dealer or agent who ma-
terially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and 
severally with and to the same extent as the seller, 
unless the nonseller who is so liable sustains the 
burden of proof that he did not know, and in 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, 
of the existence of the facts by reason of which 
the liability is alleged to exist. There is contribu-
tion as in cases of contract among the several 
persons so liable. 
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IF the defendant had pleaded the statute, then interroga-
tories could have been asked of the jury if they believed 
that the overall conduct of the Souvalls and the Bank 
showed that these parties impliedly consented that the 
Bank should act as agent on behalf of the Souvalls and 
subject to their control, and that the Bank consented to 
so act (Eestatement of Agency, Section 1). An interroga-
tory could also have been asked if they believed that the 
Bank materially aided in the sale. 
This switch of theories in the case, after the respond-
ents successfully won a jury trial, gives the appellant 
a chance to make a great jury argument to this Court. 
But it is clear that the jury chose to believe that Hunter 
was a stock promoter who jumped into the picture to 
make his fortune on the North Star Marine Sales merger. 
There was a nine day trial, and the defendant called two 
Bank officers, Don Bennett and John Langeland. Neither 
one of them was accused or sharply questioned about 
knowing that the financial statement was false or having 
information that the Universal Leasing stock was not 
worth the value placed on it in the sales agreement. Don 
Bennett stated that he discussed the fact that two state-
ments in his file showed a difference in total assets of 
$800,000 for the same date (8/31/69) and that he was not 
sure which one was right (Tr. 373). He cautioned and 
advised Hunter to audit the company himself or obtain 
additional financial information on the company (Tr. 
375). Throughout the entire record, there is no evidence 
that the plaintiffs or the Bank knew more about the 
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value of this stock than did Hunter. None of the plain-
tiffs or the Bank Officers knew of the proposed merger 
between Universal Rockwell and North Star Marine 
Sales. 
The requested instruction that the Bank was the 
agent of the Souvalls for the giving of information about 
Universal Leasing to the defendants (Tr. 147) would, 
under normal legal principles, impute a wrongful act by 
Do>n Bennett to the Souvalls, as sellers of the stock. But 
appellant's Reply Brief argues the facts as though the 
Bank was guilty of omissions under subsection 2 of the 
statute. Hunter called an accountant, Robert Apgood, to 
testify that he thought the financial statements of 8/31/69 
were false and misleading because as far as he was 
able to determine no books had been posted for 1969 by 
Universal Leasing (Tr. 479). But there was no evidence 
that Don Bennett or the Souvalls knew this. The un-
disputed fact was that during the middle of February, 
1970, Eames and Timothy were very optimistic about the 
merger between Universal Rockwell and North Star 
Marine Sales, and Hunter was meeting quite often with 
these principals to the merger. By his own testimony, 
Eames gave him two financial statements dated 3/31/69 
and 11/30/69. However, the jury chose to believe that 
Don Bennett explained the difference between the two 
statements dated 8/31/69 to Hunter, and that Hunter 
could not claim he was misled, or relied on the 8/31/69 
statement. The issues of whether or not the Bank made 
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a false representation of a material fact to the defendant 
were fairly presented to the jury by Interrogatory Nos. 
11 and 12. In Interrogatory No. 13, tht jury was asked, 
"Do you find that the representation was known by the 
Bank's officers or agents to be false when it was made 
or that such statement was made recklessly with know-
ledge that there was insufficient information upon which 
to base such statement?," and the jury answered, "No." 
This presented the theory of reckless fraud to the jury 
as announced in the cases of Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 
279, 373 P .2d 382, and Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 
18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P .2d 659, but the jury did not agree 
with Hunter's argument in this regard. 
The defendant did not plead the statute that the 
Bank was the agent of the Souvalls who materially aided 
in the sale of the stock. This fact and the evidence that 
the Bank gave information which they possessed, but 
which Souvalls did not know they had, and the submis-
sion of the basic dispute in the two versions of what hap-
pened between Bennett and Hunter, makes the ruling of 
the trial court entirely proper. It would have been error 
to tell the jury as a matter of law that the Bank was the 
agent of the Souvalls in view of the two separate Coun-
terclaims on two separate theories. 
POINT II 
PROPOSED EXHIBIT 7-D WAS PROPERLY 
EXCLUDED FROM EVIDENCE. 
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The Trial Court and Jury could plainly see that the 
motive of paying off the loan balance of approximately 
$150,000 was important to the plaintiffs, Souvalls, the 
Bank and the SBA. But the fact that this motive existed 
did not convince the jury that there was any fraud per-
petrated upon Mr. Hunter. The SBA loan application 
was prepared prior to June 10, 1969. 
I t is significant to note that intervening plaintiff at 
the trial objected to Exhibit 7-D on the grounds that it 
was immaterial and irrelevant for the court to go into 
any loan documents that were prepared a year previous 
to the agreement between the Souvalls and the defendant 
and that to go into everything that was preliminary to 
the loan being made would have been going far afield. 
In addition to this objection, we now direct this court's 
attention to the exhibit itself. I t was merely a work 
paper taken from some file. I t is not signed or dated 
and relates only to some of the assets which were even-
tually given as security for the loan. Patently, this is 
not the complete and final loan application, and for the 
defendant to premise its defense on the failure to admit 
this preliminary, incomplete, unsigned document, evi-
dently prepared approximately a year prior to the facts 
at issue, is not an error. If defendant's counterclaim 
were to be based upon a fraudulent loan application, de-
fendant had ample opportunity to have the plaintiff, 
intervening plaintiff or SBA officials produce the final 
loan application with all amendments, supporting data, 
representations and other documents which were material 
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and relevant to the application and the grant of the $200,-
000 loan. Defendant failed to do this and is now estopped 
to justify his failure by claiming he should have been 
able to introduce an incomplete document in lieu thereof. 
The appellant states that it should have been allowed 
to develop evidence about several irregularities in the 
SBA loan application. 
1. Appellant first claims that there was a failure 
to set forth in Item Two of the exhibit the fact that both 
Mr. John Langeland and Donald Bennett of the Bank 
assisted in the preparation of the loan application. It is 
immaterial to the issues of fraud, which allegedly oc-
curred in February of 1970, who prepared the loan ap-
plication in June of 1969. Elmer Fox & Company, C.P.A., 
and Daynes Business Service prepared the application 
as stated at paragraph 2, page 2. Don Bennett testified 
that he did not help prepare it or know anyone in the 
Bank who did (Tr. 357). Mr. John Langeland also testi-
fied that he did not prepare it, but the Bank had the 
forms (Tr. 434). Pete Souvall testified at Transcript 
301 that he discussed the SBA loan application with 
Mr. Langland and Mr. Bennett, and they guided him, 
but it is not a fact that they physically assisted in its 
preparation. Counsel for the plaintiffs objected on the 
grounds of relevancy and materiality to the admission of 
the SBA loan application at the time Peter Souvall was 
being cross-examined, and the matter was argued in 
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chambers (Tr. 301-302). The Trial Court denied its ad-
mission and said that the contract of sale from Souvalls 
to Hunter dated March 9, 1970, speaks for itself and 
that the extraneous matters concerning the alleged ap-
plication to the SBA nine months previous were not 
pertinent or germaine to the issues in this matter (Tr. 
303). 
2. Answering the claimed irregularity No. 2 that 
T. Bowering Woodbury and Mr. John Langeland of the 
Bank were officers and directors of the borrowing cor-
poration, Mr. Don Bennett (Tr. 356) and Mr. John 
Langeland (Tr. 443) freely admitted that Mr. Woodbury 
andn Mr. Langeland were directors of Dinner Table, not 
of S & F Supply. What appellant complains of is not 
that these facts were withheld from the jury, but that 
there was a failure to disclose this directorship in para-
graph 3 of the second page of the alleged application. 
Mr. Bennett testified that he believed the application 
asks for directors or stockholders that own 20 percent 
or more of the stock (Tr. 357), but attorney Walter Faber 
wanted to pursue the matter that the forms asked for 
the names of all directors. The court sustained the ob-
jection as to Mr. Bennett answering why Mr. Langeland 
and Mr. Woodbury were not listed as directors, because 
Don Bennett did not prepare it (Tr. 358). The Bank 
has examined its file on this particular loan, and it sent 
a letter to the SBA which fully explains that Langeland 
and Woodbury were directors and shareholders in the 
Dinner Table, but it was not a germaine issue at trial. 
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Hunter never looked at the SBA loan application before 
buying the stock, and it would have taken another half 
a day's time to prove that Daynes Business Service left 
these names out of the application, when a separate letter 
notified the SBA of such fact. 
Irregularity No. 3, as claimed by appellant, is that 
there was a failure to disclose the actual use of the loan 
proceeds in Item Eight of the application. 
One of the major problems about letting the SBA 
loan application into evidence is that there was a prior 
history of loans between the Bank and the corporate 
borrowers. The loan application (Ex. 7D) was prepared 
before June 10, 1969, and there was subsequent corres-
pondence about the fact that the Bank's 25% participa-
tion in the loan would be represented by a $50,000 debt 
which the Borrowers already owed to the Bank. The 
original application did mention that an SBA guaranteed 
loan of $13,942.21 secured by equipment would be paid 
off with the loan proceeds. There was a complete expla-
nation of all the facts to the SBA by the Bank, but it 
would have confused the jury and unduly prolonged the 
trial to put into evidence the entire SBA loan file. The 
explanation about the use of the loan proceeds by Daynes 
Business Service was completely irrelevant to the issues 
at trial. 
The actual use of the proceeds by the plaintiffs 
clearly had no bearing on whether plaintiffs or the bank, 
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nine months thereafter, were parties to either a statutory 
or common law fraud on March 9, 1970. The statement 
of the proposed use on the prelimmary document 1-B 
has even less bearing. 
The appellant's fourth contention is that there was 
an improper evaluation of the assets which were pledged 
as collateral on the loan. In the first place, this Court 
should note that this contention has very little to do with 
the admission into evidence of the incomplete applica-
tion itself. The Bank did not prepare the loan applica-
tion, and it was not the Bank who made the statements 
therein contained. As to the evaluation of the assets, 
the Universal Leasing stock in the summer of 1969 was 
restricted stock. There was no market in it to give a 
market quotation to the SB A, as to its value. The Sou-
valls obtained a letter from John Swenson, who was one 
of the principals in Universal Leasing, dated May 15, 
1969, which letter was addressed to the Souvalls and 
stated, 
"Please be advised this letter is an offer to 
purchase, at any time it is offered for sale, your 
stock in Universal Leasing Corporation (Five 
Thousand Shares Each) 5,000 at Ten Dollars per 
share. Yours truly, John C. Swenson" 
(Ex. 15P). With this letter admitted into evidence, ap-
pellant argued to the jury all the same arguments that 
he makes in his Reply Brief to this Court. With 
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the Swenson letter admitted into evidence, there was no 
materiality of the SB A loan application. The basic facts 
were proved by the best evidence rule. 
Mr. Langeland testified on his cross-examination that 
he had had an inquiry not at the Bank's instigation, but it 
came from the Spanish Fork branch, as to what basis Mr. 
Swenson down there could purchase the stock of Uni-
versal Leasing (Tr. 462, 463). Mr. Langeland told Craig 
Hunter about it, and Mr. Hunter said he was acquainted 
with Mr. Swenson and that in his opinion Mr. Swenson 
had no ability to buy the stock, and he didn't think too 
highly of his ability as a businessman either (Tr. 464). 
Later, Mr. Langeland stated that to his knowledge Mr. 
Swenson did not refuse to purchase the stock at Zions' 
request prior to January of 1970 (Tr. 475). Mr. Bennett 
testified that the Bank never called upon Mr. Swenson 
to buy the stock (Tr. 400), because "at the time that Mr. 
Hunter appeared, we no longer gave thought to offering 
it to Mr. Swenson. Mr. Hunter was very much, well, he 
was very anxious to receive this stock, and he pushed us. 
What I mean, he was trying to get this stock out of the 
Bankruptcy Court back so that we could sell it to him. 
Our attorneys were working on this. He was working 
with our attorneys and his attorney on getting a letter 
from Watkins (meant Alex Walker). There was a lot 
of pressure involved in trying to free up this stock so 
that Mr. Hunter could have it. And we had no reason 
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to consider at this time offering it, considering exercising 
this letter" (to sell the stock to John Swenson) (empha-
sis added) (Tr. 412). 
The appellant's Reply Brief tries to intimate that 
the refusal by the Trial Court to admit the SBA loan 
application prevented appellant from proving that there 
was something improper about the evaluation of the as-
sets. This is not true. The record is clear about the letter 
from John C. Swenson offering to purchase the shares, 
which were restricted stock. There is nothing contained 
in the SBA loan application which would further assist 
the jury in the question as to what further information 
the plaintiffs or the Bank had which they failed to reveal 
to Hunter. 
Respondents therefore answer the summary of the 
appellant set forth at pages 15, 16 and 17 of appellant's 
Reply Brief as follows: 
1. Relationship Between Plaintiffs and Bank Of-
ficers. Appellant proved by the direct testimony of the 
Bank's officers that T. Bowering Woodbury and John 
Langeland were directors of the Dinner Table. The fact 
that Daynes Business Service did not list their names 
as directors in the SBA loan application is entirely im-
material to Hunter being defrauded. The appellant made 
a very strong argument to the jury that this connection 
of the Bank and the plaintiffs was the basis for the Bank 
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defrauding Hunter, but the jury chose to believe Bennett 
that he tried to carefully explain to Hunter that he had 
two financial statements, and he didn't know which one 
was right; that he pointed out this difference to Hunter, 
and he cautioned and advised Hunter to audit the com-
pany himself or obtain additional financial information 
on the company (Tr. 375). Langeland testified on re-
buttal that prior to Hunter signing the final Agreement 
for $133,500 on March 9, that Hunter came into his office 
with a financial statement in his hand, and he didn't 
even sit down, and Langeland said, "Craig, it seems to 
me that you ought to do everything you can to verify 
that what you are buying has the value that you have 
in your mind that you have set on it" (Tr. 849). Hunter 
did not take the stand to deny that he had been cautioned 
by Bennett and Langeland. The entire weight of the 
evidence was that he rushed into the deal in spite of what 
Bennett pointed out as two inconsistent financial state-
ments and Langeland's attempt to advise him. Neither 
'Bennett nor Langeland knew about the North Star 
Marine merger, which motivated Hunter to rush into the 
deal. 
Hunter expects the Bank, or the jury, or now this 
Court to protect him against his own folly. His Reply 
Brief never mentions his own knowledge gained from 
Timothy and Eames about the merger between Universal 
Rockwell and North Star Marine Sales, and his anticipa-
tion at pegging the market at 10c per share for 4,530,000 
shares. The jury found by its answers to Interrogatories 
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Nos. 3, 4, 5 and 6 (Tr. 185) that Hunter knowingly made 
a false representation of fact to the Bank, to-wit: that 
he had New York securities sufficient in amount to pay 
cash for his purchase. He was so intent on his scheme 
to get stock released without having the cash to pay for 
it, that he ignored everything the Bank told him. 
2. Scienter. The jury was fully aware that the 
money to be paid under the sales agreement (Ex. 3P) was 
going to the Bank (25%) and the SBA (75%) to pay 
off the loan. The statement in the Reply Brief that be-
cause the borrowing corporations had business relation-
ships and adverse financial dealings with Universal Leas-
ing "that those relationships and dealings were the major 
factor that caused Universal Leasing to go broke" (page 
15) is not supported by the record. Universal Leasing 
was merged into Universal Rockwell on November 11, 
1969 (Ex. 6P), and the major factor which caused Uni-
versal Rockwell to go broke was the recission of its mer-
ger with North Star Marine Sales on May 27, 1970 (Ex. 
29P). 
* 3. Agency. The Reply Brief of Appellant now 
argues that the Bank should be treated as a seller of the 
stock and should be held liable if it was guilty of omis-
sions to state material facts. The decisive reason for 
affirming the jury verdict is that the appellant never 
pleaded any theory of statutory fraud against the Bank 
under 61-1-22(2). 
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4. Intentional Misstatements and Omissions. It is 
entirely fallacious to state, as appellant does, that by 
exclusion of the SBA loan application he was "prevented 
from showing how the individual plaintiffs and the in-
dvidual Bank officers mutually benefitted by their de-
ception" (page 17). Counsel for Mr. Hunter called Peter 
Souvall, Don Bennett and John Langeland as his wit-
nesses. Only one fact was elicited which the witnesses 
knew about Universal Leasing, yet this fact was already 
known by Hunter. When Dinner Table took out bank-
ruptcy, it 's own stock became worthless, and Universal 
Leasing owned 50,000 shares of stock in Dinner Table. 
This appeared as an asset worth $100,000 on the 11/30/69 
financial statement given to Hunter by Mark Eames (Tr. 
606, Ex. 23D). At that time, Eames told Hunter that 
the Dinner Table stock was worthless (Tr. 648), prior to 
the final agreement to purchase made by Hunter. 
Eames testified that he vaguely recalled the meeting at 
the Towne House. He was at that time the President of 
Universal Bockwell (on February 12, 1970), and he ex-
plained the future plans of the company to Mr. Hunter, 
and he testified that he probably explained the position 
of the company with optimism (Tr. 827). 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE INSTRUC-
TIONS. 
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As stated before, the Counterclaim by Hunter against 
the Souvalls specifically pleaded that plaintiffs were 
guilty of statutory fraud for failing to tell Hunter ma-
terial facts, "necessary in order to make the statements 
made by plaintiff to defendant, in light of the circum-
stances in which they were made, not misleading . . ." 
(Tr. 56). The Counterclaim against the Bank stated that 
it knew that the financial statements which it gave to the 
defendant were inaccurate, misleading and false, and 
that it gave Hunter the false financial statements with 
intent to deceive and defraud him (Tr. 36). After ex-
tensive discovery in obtaining an order for production 
of documents and taking the deposition of Bennett and 
Langeland, plaintiff went to trial, and from the testi-
mony of Bennett (Tr. 354), Pete Souvall (Tr. 415), 
Dangeland (Tr. 429), Apgood, the accountant, Eames 
(iTr. 569), and Hunter (Tr. 603), the Court and jury 
were all led to believe that the theory of the fraud charge 
was that Hunter would somehow prove that the Bank 
knew that the financial statements were false and that 
they gave them to Hunter with an intent to deceive him. 
Throughout the trial, the plaintiffs and intervening 
plaintiff and the Court were not aware that Hunter's 
counsel would take the position that because Souvalls 
told Hunter to get what information he wanted from the 
Bank, that this made the Bank their agent, and further, 
that the agent thereby became bound to act with the 
same duty as the principal in the sale of $100,000 worth 
of stock. The plaintiff and the Bank are entitled to know 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
28 
in a fraud case exactly what it is that they are charged 
with. (Eule 9(b), Utah Eules of Civil Procedure.) Thus, 
the theory of the trial of this case and the argument 
urged to this Court on appeal are two entirely separate 
matters. The crucial instruction is defendant's proposed 
instruction found at Tr. 147: 
" You are instructed that Zions Bank was the agent 
of the plaintiffs for the giving of information 
about Universal Leasing to the defendant." 
Based on the supposition that this instruction should 
have been given, the appellant states at page 4 that it 
is his position that having shown that Hunter went to 
the Bank to get financial statements (when he already 
had two of them from Mark Eames) and receiving the 
advice he got from Don Bennett about statements which 
the Souvalls knew nothing about, that in that capacity, 
liability could be found against both the Bank aind the 
plaintiff under the cited Utah law, to-wit: the statutory 
theory of fraud by omission to state material facts. Ap-
pellant has cited no case to sustain his position that un-
der his pleadings herein, any omission by the Bank to 
tell Hunter more than it did would be imputed to the 
Souvalls, or that because the Bank explained that it had 
two financial statements which were different in amount 
on the same date, meant that right then and there it had 
to tell Hunter about the stock when it was unlisted, had 
no market value, and when it mentioned that it had an 
inquiry about it from Mr. John Swenson. This legal field 
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of liability for a positive misrepresentation as opposed 
to an omission of a material fact is a lawyer's delight. 
A party is damned if he tells too much (puffing sales 
talk) -or damned if he tells too litttle (61-1-22 (2)). But 
it has to be pleaded, with an opportunity to meet such 
accusations before the trier of the facts. 
The theory of statutory fraud for omissions to state 
a material fact applies against a seller, who theoretically 
controls the sales price and knows whether the stock is 
worth what the buyer is to pay for it. Here the explana-
tion about the two different financial statements does 
not make the Bank the seller. It did not set the price. 
It did not sit in on any of the sales negotiations. Hunter 
knew exactly how Souvalls first wanted a $150,000 deal 
with the homes thrown in, and later a deal for $133,500 
without the homes. He knew that the Souvalls were 
setting the price on the stock and not the Bank, yet the 
very first time he came into the Bank, and before he 
was shown any financial statements, he wanted to buy 
the entire loan and all of the pledged assets. There was 
never any proof that the Bank knew the financial state-
ments were false. It is not in the position of warranting 
the truthfulness of an unsigned, unaudited financial state-
ment which found its way into its Salt Lake City files. 
Langeland explained that the loans which the Bank made 
to Universal Leasing from its Spanish Fork office were 
on the basis of leases of equipment which were pledged 
as collateral, and that the loans were made on the strength 
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of the lessee's credit and the collateral pledged, not the 
financial condition of Universal Leasing (Tr. 849, 850). 
As to the claim of error in the instructions, the Court, 
by its Instruction No. 17, stated to the jury what Hunter 
claimed in his Counterclaim against the plaintiffs and 
further instructed the jury on that portion of the statute 
which states that it is unlawful to sell a security by means 
of any omission to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not mislead-
ing. This instruction was coupled with the written In-
terrogatories Nos. 17 to 25, which were answered as 
follows: 
17. Do you find that the plaintiffs made a 
representation of a material fact to the defend-
ant, S. Craig Hunter? 
Answer: No. 
18. Do you find that the representation made 
by the plaintiffs was false? 
Answer: No. 
19. Do you find that the plaintiffs sold the 
stock to the defendant by means of any untrue 
statement of a material fact or any omission to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make 
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the statements made in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made not mislead-
ing? 
Answer: No. 
20. Do you find that if the plaintiffs made 
such untrue statement or omission to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made in the light of the circumstan-
ces under which they were made not misleading, 
that the buyer did not know of the untruth or 
omission? 
Answer: No. 
21. Do you find that the plaintiffs knew or 
should have known that Universal Rockwell, Ltd. 
was in very serious financial difficulty in Feb-
ruary and March of 1970? 
Answer: No. 
22. Do you find that the plaintiffs in Febru-
ary and March of 1970 expected the stock of 
Universal Rockwell, Ltd. to become valueless 
within a short period of time? 
Answer: No. 
23. Do you find that the defendant agreed 
to purchase the stock of Universal Rockwell, Ltd. 
as a result of plaintiff's device, scheme and arti-
fice to defraud the defendant? 
Answer: No. 
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24. Do you find that the plaintiff as seller 
of the stock did not know and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known of the 
untruth or omission for which they are charged! 
Answer: Yes. 
25. Do you find that the defendant agreed 
to purchase the stock of Universal Rockwell, Ltd. 
for reasons and purposes not within the know-
ledge of plaintiffs? 
Answer: Yes. 
(Transcript 188) 
Under B of Point III of appellant's second brief, 
contrary to his first brief, it is claimed that the Souvalls 
made omissions of material facts. 
Once again appellant is making a jury argument to 
this court and is repeating the facts presented by his 
counsel to the jury. In spite of this, the jury guided by 
Instruction No. 17 (see Intervening Plaintiffs' brief pgs. 
20-21), specifically found that the Souvalls (1) did not 
omit to state a material fact, Interrogatories 19 and 20; 
(2) did not know or should not have known that Universal 
Rockwell was in a very serious financial difficulty, In-
terrogatory 21; (3) did not know and in the exercise of 
reasonable care could not have known of the omission 
for which they were charged, Interrogatory 24. 
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To the contrary, the jury found that Hunter pur-
chased the stock for reasons and purposes not within the 
knowledge of the Souvalls, Interrogatory 25. 
The jury observed the conduct of the witnesses on 
the stand and could see that Hunter had made his deci-
sion to purchase the stock due to the facts given to Hun-
ter by Mark Eames. These two men now showed an 
animosity toward each other and had been fighting most 
of the way (Tr. 792). Mr. Eames' testimony convinced 
the jury that he withheld facts from every one for his 
personal benefit, that he would lie, perjure and stoop to 
any scheme to make a dollar. He was the one who induced 
Hunter to join him, the Timothys and McKay Smith in 
a con game; he gave Hunter two financial statements, 
Exhibits 22D and 23D, and furnished to management two 
others, Exhibits 13 and 14, that were in the Bank's file, 
having been given to Spanish Fork Branch by Swenson 
and then transmitted to Bennett. Hunter had three state-
mets in his possession to study, and presumably the other 
two were brought to his attention. The Souvalls, ac-
cording to the undisputed evidence, had actual knowledge 
of only the March 31, 1969 certified audit. Nevertheless, 
appellant argues vehemently that plaintiff, Peter Sou-
vall, is charged with knowledge on February, 1970, of 
all the falsities of these statements put out by Eames be-
cause Souvall was a director of Universal Leasing during 
the period covered by the statements. In other words, 
appellant's counsel claims a director, not active in man-
agement, having no knowledge of the status of the com-
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pany's accounting records, is charged with a breach of 
omission of a fiduciary duty, because the president 
puts out false statements which came into the hands of 
a prospective buyer of the company's stock, all of which 
is unknown to the director. We know of no law charging 
a director or seller with the penalties of statutory omis-
sion under such a set of facts. The jury found the Sou-
valls not chargeable with such omissions, nor does the 
law, as will be submitted shortly. 
Under this point, relating to omission by the plain-
tiff, appellant cites the relevancy of the financial state-
ments. Two days of the trial were devoted to bringing 
them to the attention of the jury. A fair summary of 
this evidence and testimony is as follows : 
Other than the certified statement dated March 31, 
1969, they were all based on estimates and figures that 
Eames told his bookkeeper to show, and were devised 
according to whatever use Eames chose to make of them. 
This is indicated by comparing the net worth as shown 
on the five statements, as well as the statement later pre-
pared by CPA Apgood. 
Exhibit 
22D 
13P 
14P 
18P 
23D 
24D 
Date 
3/31/69 
8/31/69 
8/31/69 
8/31/69 
11/30/69 
3/31/70 
Amount 
$391,000 
702,000 
714,000 
614,000 
562,000 
1,659,000 
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Appellant's three attorneys have argued, and now 
want this Court to believe that a prospective buyer who 
is a college graduate in business administration, who 
studied law for two years, was a broker and stock sales-
man with an NASD license and a partner in a successful 
insurance firm, when given copies of or shown such 
financial statements was defrauded by a seller because 
(1) that seller as a director is charged with their falsity, 
even though he did not know they existed, and (2) that 
his companies had had some dealings with the corpora-
tion, and as a result thereof, the latter's income had sufu 
fered. 
A buyer of Hunter's sophistication should have been 
put on notice by a cursory examination of the statements 
submitted to him that they were wildly inconsistent and 
should not now complain or assert that the omissions 
charged to Souvall would have been sufficient to present 
him from going forward with the March purchase. 
The jury in determining who was the "def rauder" and 
who was the "defraudee" had the opportunity of listen-
ing to the testimony of the principal witnesses, Peter 
Souvall, Craig Hunter, Mark Eames and Robert Apgood. 
We believe the members of the jury were impressed by 
which witnesses were forthright and divulged all facts 
in their dealings, and, as a result of listening to the pro-
longed analysis of certain financial records, became con-
vinced that Hunter, Eames and Apgood knew far more 
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about Universal Rockwell than plaintiffs and put out 
statements which proved to have glaring omissions, 
whereas Souvall made no representations and was guilty 
of withholding nothing. 
As support for this conclusion, we direct the Court's 
attention to certain facts brought out by the exhibits 
introduced: 
-(a) Income. Hunter testified that he was interested 
in income and assets. Assuming such a rash conclusion 
is true, the exhibits show the income figures as follows: 
Exhibit Period Source Amount 
22P 3/31/69 Barnes $37,303 
13P 4/ 1/69 to 8/31/69 In Bennett's file 47,629 
14P 4/ 1/69 to 8/31/69 In Bennett's file 59,627 
18P 4/ 1/69 to 8/31/69 * 59,627 
23D 4/ 1/69 to 11/30/69 Eames 7,268 
24D 4/ 1/69 to 3/31/70 Apgood net loss 
($126,188) 
(#Hunter claims Bennett gave him this.) 
The certified statement showed net income of $37,303 
for the full prior year (Ex. 22P) By November, 1969, 
six months' earnings had gone down to $7,268; the full 
year's loss was $126,188. We pose the question, did Mr. 
Hunter rely on any of the financial statements, or was 
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he taking the word of Eames and Timothy as to what 
, could be done? The jury supplied the answer to this 
question. 
(b) Assets. Some emphasis has been placed upon 
Souvall's failure to disclose to Hunter concerning certain 
transactions involving Dinner Table and Universal Leas-
ing and the effect these transactions had on the value of 
the stock he was acquiring. First of all, he certainly 
knew about the bankruptcy of Dinner Table and the fact 
that the $100,000 valuation placed upon the stock of 
Dinner Table had to be wiped out. The $50,000 trans-
action involving the California franchise was known to 
Hunter from the last page of the Elmer Fox statement 
(Ex. 22P) and was not a matter of concern. Of more 
importance, after the February meeting with Eames, 
Timothy, Smith and Oahoon, Hunter knew about all of 
the additional assets which were part of the merger be-
tween Universal Rockwell and Timothy's corporations, 
by virtue of which the corporate assets had increased, 
according to Apgood's book figures, by over One Million 
Dollars. Two net assets which Hunter claimed were only 
"sugar on the cake" (Tr. 650) appeared on Apgood's 
statement of March 31, 1970, but by May 30, 1970, ac-
cording to the minutes of the corporation (Ex. 30P), 
had all evaporated. Thus, the stock in Mr. G's Gas and 
Goods, carried at a value of $150,000, which Apgood in a 
note stated, "It is the company's opinion that this valua-
tion is materially understated," was returned to Mr. 
Swenson by board action because the banks were about 
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to foreclose on the corporation, and Mr. Swenson agreed 
to take the stations and franchises and to assume the 
liabilities in connection therewith; Apgood still carried 
Dinner Table Stock at $100,000, although by this date the 
corporation had been adjudicated a bankrupt; the ship 
($325,000) and Brazilian land ($1,250,000) were lost to 
the company as a result of the rescission. (See Ex. 
29P.) Hunter, however, in possession of Apgood's re-
port, knowing of the loss to the corporation and the re-
duction in the corporate assets as outlined above in the 
total amount of $1,750,000, had no compunction in offer-
ing to sell about one-half of the stock he had purloined 
from the Bank to any buyer who would give him $65,000 
(Tr. 704 and Ex. 35P). Again, we ask, who was the "de-
frauder," and who was the "defraudee," Another answer 
to this question might be found from the following testi-
mony of Mr. Hunter. He admitted that he had to get a 
block of free trading stock to, "Make money. It was my 
only incentive" (Tr. (328). 
The Utah securities fraud statute is copied from 
Eule X 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
issued pursuant to Section 10(b) of 15 U.S.C., §78j(b) 
(17 C.F.E., 240.10b-5). The federal cases construing this 
Eule have said : 
These quoted words as they appear in the statute 
can only mean that Congress forbid not only the 
telling of purposeful falsity but also the telling of 
half-truths and the failure to tell the "whole 
truth." (Hughes v. S.E.C., 174 F .2d at 976.) 
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.. In KoMer v. KoMer Co., 319 F.2d 634, the 7th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
It is clear that the statute was intended to 
create a form of fiduciary relationship between 
so-called corporate "insiders" and "outsiders" 
with whom they deal in company securities which 
places upon the insider duties more exacting than 
mere abstention from what generally is thought 
to be fraudulent practices. If so, the question 
arises: What are the limits of those duties! We 
are satisfied that the answer cannot be confined 
to an abstract rule but must be fashioned case by 
case as particular facts dictate. 
Of course general principles, implicit in the 
statute and the rule and elucidated by decisions, 
are helpful and may be utilized. 
[4] We think Judge Leahy in Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-829 (D.C.Del. 
1951), stated the general principles that are appli-
cable in terms upon which we cannot improve: 
"It is unlawful for an insider, such as a 
majority stockholder, to purchase the stock 
of minority stockholders without disclosing 
material facts affecting the value of the stock, 
known to the majority stockholder by virute 
of his inside position but not known to the 
selling minority stockholders, which informa-
tion would have affected the judgment of the 
sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from 
the necessity of preventing a corporate in-
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sider from utilizing his position to take un-
fair advantage of the uninformed minority 
stockholders. I t is an attempt to provide 
some degree of equalization of bargaining 
position in order that the minority may exer-
cise an informed judgment in any such trans-
action. Some courts have called this a fidu-
ciary duty while others state it is a duty im-
posed by the "special circumstances." One 
of the primary purposes of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et 
seq., was to outlaw the use of inside informa-
tion by corporate officers and principal stock-
holders for their own financial advantage to 
the detriment of uninformed public security 
holder's." 
The statute and the rule basically call for 
fair play and abstention on the part of the cor-
porate insider from taking unfair advantage of 
the uninformed outsider or minority stockholder. 
Such a standard requires the insider to exercise 
reasonable and due diligence not only in ascer-
taining what is material as of the time of the 
transaction but in disclosing fully those material 
facts about which the outsider is presumably un-
informed and which would, in reasonable antici-
pation, affect his judgment. 
See also Myzel v. Fields, 8th C.C.A. 386 F2d at page 733. 
The evidence is clear that the Souvalls were not directors 
of Universal Eockwell in February of 1970, nor did any 
bank officers hold the position of an insider, with su-
perior knowledge of the financial affairs of Universal 
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In Kohler v, Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, the 7th Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals stated as follows: 
I t is clear that the statute was intended to 
create a form of fiduciary relationship between 
so-called corporate "insiders" and "outsiders" 
with whom they deal in company securities which 
places upon the insider duties more exacting than 
mere abstention from what generally is thought 
to be fraudulent practices. If so, the question 
arises: What are the limits of those duties? We 
are satisfied that the answer cannot be confined 
to an abstract rule but must be fashioned case by 
case as particular facts dictate. 
Of course general principles, implicit in the 
statute and the rule and elucidated by decisions, 
are helpful and may be utilized. 
[4] We think Judge Leahy in Speed v. Trans-
america Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 828-829 (D.C.Del. 
1951), stated the general principles that are appli-
cable in terms upon which we cannot improve: 
"It is unlawful for an insider, such as a 
majority stockholder, to purchase the stock 
of minority stockholders without disclosing 
material facts affecting the value of the stock, 
known to the majority stockholder by virute 
of his inside position but not known to the 
selling minority stockholders, which informa-
tion would have affected the judgment of the 
sellers. The duty of disclosure stems from 
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sider from utilizing his position to take un-
fair advantage of the uninformed minority 
stockholders. I t is an attempt to provide 
some degree of equalization of bargaining 
position in order that the minority may exer-
cise an informed judgment in any such trans-
action. Some courts have called this a fidu-
ciary duty while others state it is a duty im-
posed by the "special circumstances." One 
of the primary purposes of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78a et 
seq., was to outlaw the use of inside informa-
tion by corporate officers and principal stock-
holders for their own financial advantage to 
the detriment of uninformed public security 
holders.'' 
The statute and the rule basically call for 
fair play and abstention on the part of the cor-
porate insider from taking unfair advantage of 
the uninformed outsider or minority stockholder. 
Such a standard requires the insider to exercise 
reasonable and due diligence not only in ascer-
taining what is material as of the time of the 
transaction but in disclosing fully those material 
facts about which the outsider is presumably un-
informed and which would, in reasonable antici-
pation, affect his judgment. 
See also Myzel v. Fields, 8th C.C.A. 386 F2d at page 733. 
The evidence is clear that the Souvalls were not directors 
of Universal Rockwell in February of 1970, nor did any 
bank officers hold the position of an insider, with su-
perior knowledge of the financial affairs of Universal 
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Rockwell. Hunter, after learning of the proposed merger 
between Rockwell and North Star Marine Sales, had 
greater inside information than the Souvalls or the Bank. 
Hunter was given an 11/30/69 financial statement by 
Eames which is three months fresher in date than the 
two inconsistent statements which Bennett pointed out 
to him. Under these facts, there is no blanket duty on 
the part of the Souvalls, as sellers of the stock, to tell 
everything that they knew about the past history of 
Universal Leasing, the predecessor of Universal Rock-
well. (See Loss, Securities Regulation, 2nd Ed., Vol III, 
pages 1448 et seq.) 
The Utah statute itself (61-1-22 (b) makes it clear 
that liability only attaches in the case of (1) any untrue 
statement of a material fact, or (2) any omission to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made in the light of the circumstances under which they 
are made, not misleading (the buyer not knowing of the 
untruth or omission). The Reply Brief does not point to 
any question which Hunter asked the Souvalls or the 
Bank about a material fact which questions were answer-
ed untruthfully, or which there was an omission to state 
a material fact NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAKE 
THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE LIGHT OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THEY 
ARE MADE NOT MISLEADING. The jury found 
specifically that the Souvalls did not do this; that they 
did not know that Universal Rockwell was in very serious 
financial difficulty in February and March of 1970; that 
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the defendant did not agree to purchase the stock of Uni-
versal Eockwell, Ltd. as a result of plaintiff's device 
scheme and artifice to defraud. Appellant is now making 
a jury argument to this Court, but the jury could see 
that it was Hunter who was the stock promoter; that 
Hunter lied to the Bank about having New York securi-
ties ; that Hunter rushed headlong into the deal because 
of his superior knowledge about a merger of North Star 
Marine Sales ($1,500,000) and Universal Eockwell with 
a shareholder's equity of $561,759.64, according to the 
November statement given him by Mr. Eames (Ex. 23D). 
POINT IV 
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS PROPERLY 
EXPLAINED TO THE JURY. 
In its Special Interrogatories, the Court told the 
jury that the burden was upon the plaintiffs and the 
intervenor to establish by clear and convincing evidence 
that Hunter had defrauded the Bank in obtaining the 
shares of stock without paying cash (Tr. 186). As to 
the defendant's defense of common law fraud allegedly 
perpetrated by the Bank upon Hunter, this was like-
wise placed upon the defendant to prove each of the 
interrogatories by clear and convincing evidence. This 
is the rule in Utah in fraud cases. Perry v. Mconkie et. 
al., 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P.2d 852; Pace et al. v. Parrish, 
122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273; Shaw v. Abraham, 12 Utah 
2d 150, 364 P.2d 7; Lundstrom v. Radio Corp. of America, 
17 Utah 2d 112, 405 P.2d 339. 
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However, the statute (61-1-22(b) merely speaks in 
terms of the buyer of the securities sustaining "the bur-
den of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise 
of reasonable care could not have known of the untruth 
or omission." For this reason, the special interrogatories 
did not require Hunter to prove a violation of the statute 
by clear and convincing evidence. The court in its general 
instruction No. 6 (Tr. 156) gave J.LF.IT. No. 2.1, that 
burden of proof means a preponderance of the evidence. 
However, the interrogatories concerning statutory fraud 
merely asked the questions without telling the jury what 
the burden of proof was (Tr. 188). This was perfectly 
fair to the appellant. 
The appellant complains in his brief that there were 
numerous errors in the instructions Nos. 5 and 6, but 
no exceptions were taken to these instructions (Tr. 1034). 
The defendant must be bound by the confusion which 
he himself created by pleading and testifying that the 
Bank deceived him by giving him a false financial state-
ment, and that the Souvalls omitted to tell him material 
facts necessary under the circumstances. This theory of 
commission by the Bank and omission by the Souvalls is 
readily apparent from reading the direct examination of 
the witnesses called by the appellant. I t was not until 
after the case was completely closed and all parties had 
rested (Tr. 901) that counsel for appellant in chambers 
began to argue that under Eule 15(b) of the Utah Eules 
of Civil Procedure " . . . that if there is a deficiency in 
our pleadings . . . when issues not raised by the pleadings 
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are tried by express or implied consent of the parties 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been 
in the pleadings" (Tr. 957). Counsel for the Souvalls 
and the Bank objected that no theory of agency had been 
tried with their express or implied consent. So in the 
light of the evidence that Hunter claimed he was de-
frauded by the Bank giving him a false financial state-
ment, but the Souvalls were guilty of omissions (they 
did not discuss the stocks' inherent value at all), there 
had to be special written interrogatories to sort out the 
truth of each charge of fraud. It would have been re-
versible prejudieal error to instruct the jury AS A MAT-
TEE OF LAW, as Hunter requested, that the Bank was 
the agent of the Souvalls, and therefore the Bank was 
also charged with the duty of stating all material facts 
known to it NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MAKE THE 
STATEMENTS MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THEY ARE 
MADE NOT MISLEADING. The instructions were 
eminently fair and when considered as a whole clearly 
defined the issues raised by the pleadings and the evi-
dence. The answers to the interrogatories were entirely 
consistent, and the jury's answers did not indicate any 
confusion or lack of understanding as to whom they chose 
to believe. 
In the light of all circumstances, in view of the de-
tailed instructions concerning representations and omis-
sions, plus the jury's answers to the specific questions, 
there was no error. 
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POINT V 
THE COURT WAS NOT IN ERROR IN DIS-
MISSING DEPENDANT'S COUNTERCLAIMS. 
This argument has been covered in the previous 
briefs. We can only refer the court to the evidence. De-
fendant failed to introduce one bit of evidence that he 
paid any amount to the bank from his own resources. 
To the contrary, every cent resulted from sales of stock 
or inventory. 
We fail to see how Hunter was damaged either under 
a rescission theory or a damage theory when he did not 
prove that he had paid more than he had received on the 
sale of the stock. There was no dispute that he had re-
ceived in cash the following amounts that he could re-
member: 
Buyer Shares Price Amount Transaction 
Atkinson ........ 25,000 
Reid 10,000 
Steeley 10,000 
Ford 10,000 
Brockbank .... 5,000 
$.10 
$.10 
$.10 
$.10 
$.10 
$2500 
1000 
1000 
1000 
500 
789 
801 
801 
801 
802 
Brinton gave him $6,000 and Hunter gave him 450,000 
shares of stock (Tr. 810). 
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In addition, Hunter turned over 500,000 shares to 
Eames for $10,000, an air-conditioner and computer floor 
(Tr. 790). 
With this evidence in mind, the Trial judge had no 
alternative but to rule that defendant's counterclaims 
should not be submitted to the jury because Hunter ad-
duced no evidence of damages. Also, the jury answered 
the interrogatories that no fraud whatsoever was per-
petrated upon Hunter. This point is moot. 
CONCLUSION 
After re-reading the 849 pages of the Transcript, 
respondent's counsel realize that it is impossible to 
dearly present all of the facts to this Court about the 
inter-dealings between Hunter, Eames and Timothy. 
However, we repeat that the great weight of the testimony 
was that Hunter was motivated in buying the stock be-
cause of the merger of North Star Marine Sales, and this 
was a promoter's scheme to show $2,000,000 worth of 
assets on a new financial statement so that the Universal 
Rockwell shares could be pegged at 10c a share. The net 
effect of all the cross-examination is that Hunter ad-
mitted this to be true. The merger was rescinded be-
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tween Eames and Timothy, because of their own mis-
representations to each other, and Hunter was left in 
the lurch with trying to sell his stock. 
Neither the original Brief wor the Reply Brief of 
the appellant mentions or admits to any of the evidence 
concerning the merger between North Star Marine Sales 
and Universal RochwelL This was the critidal fact upon 
which the jury found against him. The appellant does 
not argue that the evidence is insufficient for the jury 
to have answered the written interrogatories in the man-
ner in which they did. There were 25 answers given which 
were entirely consistent as to the jury's determination 
concerning who was the defrauder and who was the de-
fraudee. 
Appellant was not denied the opportunity to prove 
the allegations which he continues to make, so irrespon-
sibly. He now wishes that he had tried the case on a 
different theory, one of statutory fraud against the 
Bank, and that there was an evil conspiracy between the 
Souvalls and the Bank to defraud him. His counsel never 
did ask questions such as these. All of these second 
thoughts about how his first counsel tried the case are 
a defensive mechanism to forgetting about how at the 
time of his rash purchase he thought he could obtain the 
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Souvall shares on credit and sell the new Universal 
Rockwell shares for $453,000. 
In the final analysis, fraud is a question of fact, and 
this case was fairly presented to the jury. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Alvin I. Smith 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Richard H. Neheker 
Attorney for Intervening Plaintiff 
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